GME (GME)
Quantitative Summary
DeterministicFinancial health is average: Piotroski 6/9, Altman Z 2.8. Beneish M-Score of 2.43 exceeds the -2.22 academic threshold — earnings quality may warrant further review.
Generated deterministically from quant metrics and financial statements. Not a recommendation.
Algorithmic Teardown
AI-GeneratedThe capital allocation efficiency presents a significant divergence from the reported profitability metrics, as Return on Invested Capital sits at 2.3% while the Weighted Average Cost of Capital is elevated at 12.7%, creating a negative spread of -10.3%. This indicates that core operations are currently destroying shareholder value despite maintaining healthy gross margins of 33.0% and net margins of 11.5%. The Piotroski F-Score of 6/9 suggests reasonable financial strength relative to peers, yet the Altman Z-Score of 2.8 places the entity in the "grey zone" regarding bankruptcy risk, a concern potentially amplified by declining revenue growth of -5.1% year-over-year and a Beneish M-Score of 2.43 that warrants scrutiny for potential earnings manipulation risks.
Valuation metrics reflect substantial optimism relative to fundamental performance, with the current Price-to-Earnings ratio at 28.8x significantly outpacing what might be justified by negative ROIC-WACC spreads and shrinking top-line revenue. A Discounted Cash Flow analysis implies a fair value of $15, suggesting the market price currently embeds aggressive growth assumptions that contradict the observed contraction in sales volume. The disconnect between high multiple compression risks driven by declining fundamentals and the premium valuation highlights an environment where any further deterioration in margin quality or cash flow generation could precipitate a sharp re-rating downward.
While the Piotroski score offers some buffer against immediate distress, the combination of negative capital returns and revenue contraction introduces substantial downside volatility. The Altman Z-Score's proximity to the failure threshold necessitates caution regarding liquidity constraints, particularly if the current leverage structure cannot support the observed cost of capital. Investors must weigh whether the high valuation multiple compensates sufficiently for the operational headwinds or represents a speculative premium detached from sustainable economic earnings power.
Generated by LLM from quantitative data inputs. May contain inaccuracies. Not investment advice.
DCF Sandbox
InteractiveSensitivity Matrix
| TG ↓ / WACC → | 10.7% | 12.7% | 14.7% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2% | $16 | $14 | $13 |
| 3% | $17 | $15 | $13 |
| 4% | $19 | $16 | $14 |
Center = base case. Green = >10% upside, Red = >10% downside vs —.
Pre-computed DCF: WACC=12.7%, terminal growth 3%. Fair value $15 (+0.0%). Not investment advice.
Price Chart with Moving Averages
Quant Health Deep Dive
Profitability & Value Creation
Balance Sheet Health
Earnings Surprise History
EPS estimates vs actuals for the most recent reported quarters. Source: yfinance.
Underwater (Drawdown from Peak)
How far below the all-time high the price has been over time. Deeper = more pain for holders.
Rolling 60-Day Beta vs S&P 500 (VOO)
How the stock's sensitivity to market moves changes over time. β > 1 = more volatile than the market.
Fundamentals
Passive Flow Attribution
ETF Draft EffectWhen investors buy or sell ETFs like XRT or MDYV, the fund manager is mechanically forced to buy or sell GME shares regardless of GME's individual fundamentals. We estimate $620M of passive capital is structurally linked to GME through 8 tracked ETFs. Passive flows have a limited but growing influence on GME's daily trading dynamics.
Passive exposure = Σ (ETF AUM × stock weight in ETF) across 8 tracked ETFs. Actual passive ownership is larger (includes mutual funds). Not investment advice.
ETF Contagion Visualizer
Simulate a price drop in GME to visualize passive redemption contagion across ETFs and collateral stocks.
If GME (GME) experiences a significant drawdown, ETF redemptions can create collateral selling pressure on co-held stocks. Our model identifies DICK S SPORTING GOODS INC (DKS) as the most exposed collateral stock, sharing 3 ETFs with GME. This is the "Passive Contagion" effect described in the Inelastic Market Hypothesis.
Contagion model based on shared ETF exposure and constituent weights across 12 tracked ETFs. Estimated selling pressure is a simplified model — actual impact depends on market liquidity, ETF redemption mechanics, and market-maker activity.
GME Ownership Dynamics
ETFs with Highest GME Exposure
Float lock-up computed from 12 ETFs tracked by SecuritiesDB. Actual passive ownership is higher (includes mutual funds, pension funds, etc.).
GME Capital Efficiency
How efficiently does GME convert operating profits into free cash? The FCF Conversion ratio measures the gap between accounting earnings and real cash generation.
GME converts 199% of its EBITDA into free cash flow, an exceptional conversion rate indicating an asset-light business model with minimal capital reinvestment drag. However, the ROIC-WACC spread is negative (-10.4%), suggesting reinvested capital is destroying shareholder value.
Capital efficiency = Free Cash Flow ÷ EBITDA. Reinvestment = (EBITDA − FCF) ÷ EBITDA. Metrics from latest annual filings. Not investment advice.
Fails-to-Deliver (FTD) History
SEC-reported settlement failures. Elevated FTDs can indicate high short-selling pressure, operational settlement issues, or naked shorting activity.
| Date | Failed Shares | Close Price | Notional Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-14 | 443,681 | $22.08 | $9.8M |
| 2026-05-13 | 182,600 | $22.37 | $4.1M |
| 2026-05-12 | 145,638 | $23.17 | $3.4M |
| 2026-05-11 | 171,556 | $24.28 | $4.2M |
| 2026-05-08 | 19,894 | $23.97 | $476,859.18 |
| 2026-05-05 | 130,264 | $23.84 | $3.1M |
| 2026-05-04 | 52,755 | $26.53 | $1.4M |
| 2026-04-30 | 1,348 | $24.52 | $33,052.96 |
| 2026-04-29 | 21,429 | $25.09 | $537,653.61 |
| 2026-04-24 | 1,395 | $25.01 | $34,888.95 |
| 2026-04-23 | 5,007 | $25.66 | $128,479.62 |
| 2026-04-22 | 5 | $24.46 | $122.3 |
| 2026-04-20 | 339,897 | $24.55 | $8.3M |
| 2026-04-17 | 219,241 | $25.18 | $5.5M |
| 2026-04-16 | 32,964 | $24.79 | $817,177.56 |
| 2026-04-15 | 2,073 | $24.03 | $49,814.19 |
| 2026-04-13 | 600 | $23.22 | $13,932 |
| 2026-04-10 | 47,202 | $22.87 | $1.1M |
| 2026-04-09 | 48,242 | $22.91 | $1.1M |
| 2026-04-08 | 62,913 | $23.43 | $1.5M |
| 2026-04-06 | 4,694 | $23.36 | $109,651.84 |
| 2026-03-31 | 24,739 | $22.27 | $550,937.53 |
| 2026-03-30 | 1,853 | $22.10 | $40,951.3 |
| 2026-03-27 | 1,137 | $22.56 | $25,650.72 |
| 2026-03-24 | 128,365 | $23.03 | $3.0M |
| 2026-03-23 | 6 | $22.57 | $135.42 |
| 2026-03-20 | 9,104 | $23.23 | $211,485.92 |
| 2026-03-19 | 2,743 | $23.36 | $64,076.48 |
| 2026-03-18 | 88,286 | $23.59 | $2.1M |
| 2026-03-17 | 355 | $23.28 | $8,264.4 |
Source: SEC Regulation SHO FTD data. Data is reported with a ~30 day delay. High FTD quantities relative to average daily volume may indicate settlement stress.
Compare GME to Peers
Quant metrics computed deterministically from financial statements and price data. Updated: N/A.
SecuritiesDB provides programmatic data aggregation for informational purposes only. None of the metrics, summaries, or algorithmic flags constitute a recommendation to buy or sell any security.