Advance Auto Parts, Inc. (AAP)
Quantitative Summary
DeterministicAAP trades at 45.1x earnings, roughly in line with its sector average of 35.0x. Financial health is average: Piotroski 4/9, Altman Z 1.7.
Generated deterministically from quant metrics and financial statements. Not a recommendation.
Algorithmic Teardown
AI-GeneratedThe fundamental economics of Advance Auto Parts present a stark divergence between top-line profitability and capital efficiency, characterized by an ROIC-WACC spread of -7.1%, indicating that the company is currently destroying value relative to its cost of capital. This negative spread stems from negligible net margins at 0.5% despite robust gross margins near 43.4%, a structural weakness exacerbated by declining revenue growth of -5.4%. The DuPont decomposition reveals that this low ROE of 2.0% is driven almost entirely by high leverage (Equity Multiplier of 5.38x) rather than operational efficiency or margin expansion, as asset turnover remains modest at 0.73x. Compounding these fundamental concerns are distress signals from credit and financial health metrics; an Altman Z-Score of 1.7 places the firm in the "grey zone" for potential bankruptcy risk, while a Piotroski F-Score of 4/9 suggests deteriorating fundamentals compared to historical norms. Conversely, the Beneish M-Score of -2.83 offers some reassurance regarding earnings manipulation risks, though it does not offset the broader quality deficits indicated by the capital allocation and margin data.
Valuation metrics further highlight a significant premium that appears disconnected from current operational performance. Trading at 45.1x forward earnings, AAP commands a substantial multiple above the sector average of 36.4x, implying the market is pricing in aggressive future growth or expects a rapid resolution to its profitability challenges. This valuation disconnect persists even as revenue contracts and returns on invested capital remain deeply negative, suggesting that current prices may incorporate optimistic assumptions about margin reversion or asset base optimization that are not yet reflected in reported results. Without evidence of improving leverage efficiency or top-line stabilization, the high multiple creates a vulnerability where any further deterioration in fundamentals could precipitate a sharp repricing to align with the observed capital destruction and sector peers.
Insider activity over the last 90 days remains neutral at $0 flow, providing no clear directional signal from management regarding their view on near-term prospects or valuation levels. While the low Beneish score mitigates concerns about fraudulent accounting, the combination of negative ROIC-WACC spread, shrinking revenues, and elevated leverage suggests a high-risk profile where downside protection is limited by financial distress indicators. The risk/reward dynamic appears skewed toward volatility, as the stock must generate significant operational improvements to justify its premium valuation relative to both historical norms and sector averages without triggering further solvency concerns flagged by the Altman metric.
Generated by LLM from quantitative data inputs. May contain inaccuracies. Not investment advice.
Valuation Context
Price Chart with Moving Averages
Quant Health Deep Dive
Profitability & Value Creation
DuPont Analysis — ROE Decomposition
Breaking down Return on Equity to see how the company generates its ROE — efficiency, margins, or leverage.
Balance Sheet Health
Earnings Surprise History
EPS estimates vs actuals for the most recent reported quarters. Source: yfinance.
Underwater (Drawdown from Peak)
How far below the all-time high the price has been over time. Deeper = more pain for holders.
Rolling 60-Day Beta vs S&P 500 (VOO)
How the stock's sensitivity to market moves changes over time. β > 1 = more volatile than the market.
Fundamentals
Passive Flow Attribution
ETF Draft EffectWhen investors buy or sell ETFs like XRT or SLYV, the fund manager is mechanically forced to buy or sell AAP shares regardless of Advance Auto Parts, Inc.'s individual fundamentals. We estimate $132M of passive capital is structurally linked to AAP through 8 tracked ETFs. Passive flows have a limited but growing influence on AAP's daily trading dynamics.
Passive exposure = Σ (ETF AUM × stock weight in ETF) across 8 tracked ETFs. Actual passive ownership is larger (includes mutual funds). Not investment advice.
ETF Contagion Visualizer
Simulate a price drop in Advance Auto Parts, Inc. to visualize passive redemption contagion across ETFs and collateral stocks.
If Advance Auto Parts, Inc. (AAP) experiences a significant drawdown, ETF redemptions can create collateral selling pressure on co-held stocks. Our model identifies Amazon.com Inc. (AMZN) as the most exposed collateral stock, sharing 1 ETFs with AAP. This is the "Passive Contagion" effect described in the Inelastic Market Hypothesis.
Contagion model based on shared ETF exposure and constituent weights across 8 tracked ETFs. Estimated selling pressure is a simplified model — actual impact depends on market liquidity, ETF redemption mechanics, and market-maker activity.
AAP Ownership Dynamics
ETFs with Highest AAP Exposure
Float lock-up computed from 8 ETFs tracked by SecuritiesDB. Actual passive ownership is higher (includes mutual funds, pension funds, etc.).
AAP Capital Efficiency
How efficiently does Advance Auto Parts, Inc. convert operating profits into free cash? The FCF Conversion ratio measures the gap between accounting earnings and real cash generation.
Advance Auto Parts, Inc. converts -93% of its EBITDA into free cash flow, negative FCF conversion — the company is consuming cash faster than it generates EBITDA, which is unsustainable long-term. The 193% reinvestment rate signals aggressive capacity expansion. However, the ROIC-WACC spread is negative (-7.1%), suggesting reinvested capital is destroying shareholder value.
Capital efficiency = Free Cash Flow ÷ EBITDA. Reinvestment = (EBITDA − FCF) ÷ EBITDA. Metrics from latest annual filings. Not investment advice.
Fails-to-Deliver (FTD) History
SEC-reported settlement failures. Elevated FTDs can indicate high short-selling pressure, operational settlement issues, or naked shorting activity.
| Date | Failed Shares | Close Price | Notional Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-11 | 6,941 | $56.15 | $389,737.15 |
| 2026-05-08 | 1,730 | $57.23 | $99,007.9 |
| 2026-05-07 | 613 | $58.07 | $35,596.91 |
| 2026-05-04 | 1,045 | $58.93 | $61,581.85 |
| 2026-05-01 | 95 | $59.51 | $5,653.45 |
| 2026-04-21 | 157 | $57.27 | $8,991.39 |
| 2026-04-20 | 4,970 | $57.49 | $285,725.3 |
| 2026-04-17 | 127 | $56.66 | $7,195.82 |
| 2026-04-16 | 582 | $56.88 | $33,104.16 |
| 2026-04-15 | 772 | $56.01 | $43,239.72 |
| 2026-04-14 | 23 | $56.36 | $1,296.28 |
| 2026-04-13 | 1,299 | $54.59 | $70,912.41 |
| 2026-04-10 | 2,060 | $56.53 | $116,451.8 |
| 2026-04-09 | 33,704 | $54.50 | $1.8M |
| 2026-04-07 | 6,794 | $53.00 | $360,082 |
| 2026-04-06 | 2,801 | $51.83 | $145,175.83 |
| 2026-04-02 | 3,660 | $54.40 | $199,104 |
| 2026-03-31 | 9,044 | $51.16 | $462,691.04 |
| 2026-03-26 | 22,256 | $52.73 | $1.2M |
| 2026-03-20 | 46,939 | $48.34 | $2.3M |
| 2026-03-19 | 65,412 | $49.36 | $3.2M |
| 2026-03-18 | 23,688 | $51.92 | $1.2M |
| 2026-03-17 | 467 | $53.19 | $24,839.73 |
| 2026-03-16 | 16,427 | $51.73 | $849,768.71 |
| 2026-03-12 | 37,074 | $53.33 | $2.0M |
| 2026-03-11 | 49,303 | $51.07 | $2.5M |
| 2026-03-02 | 1,703 | $53.17 | $90,548.51 |
| 2026-02-24 | 4 | $55.37 | $221.48 |
| 2026-02-23 | 1,206 | $55.87 | $67,379.22 |
| 2026-02-19 | 2 | $55.93 | $111.86 |
Source: SEC Regulation SHO FTD data. Data is reported with a ~30 day delay. High FTD quantities relative to average daily volume may indicate settlement stress.
Compare AAP to Peers
Quant metrics computed deterministically from financial statements and price data. Updated: N/A.
SecuritiesDB provides programmatic data aggregation for informational purposes only. None of the metrics, summaries, or algorithmic flags constitute a recommendation to buy or sell any security.