Dycom Industries, Inc. (DY)
Quantitative Summary
DeterministicDY trades at 34.5x earnings, roughly in line with its sector average of 44.7x. Financial health is average: Piotroski 4/9, Altman Z 3.3. Beneish M-Score of -2.17 exceeds the -2.22 academic threshold — earnings quality may warrant further review.
Generated deterministically from quant metrics and financial statements. Not a recommendation.
Algorithmic Teardown
AI-GeneratedThe fundamental economics of Dycom Industries reveal a capital allocation challenge where the return on invested capital of 6.9% falls significantly below the weighted average cost of capital at 10.9%, generating a negative spread of -4.0%. This inefficiency suggests that current operations are destroying value relative to financing costs, even as revenue expands rapidly by 17.9% year-over-year. While the Beneish M-Score of -2.17 indicates low earnings manipulation risk and the Altman Z-Score of 3.3 places the firm in a zone of moderate safety regarding bankruptcy probability, the Piotroski F-Score of 4/9 highlights structural weaknesses or lack of financial strength improvements that constrain overall quality. The DuPont decomposition is obscured by this capital inefficiency; despite healthy gross margins at 20.6% and net margins at 5.1%, the inability to generate returns above the cost of equity undermines long-term compounding potential regardless of top-line velocity.
Valuation metrics present a complex picture where the current P/E multiple of 34.5x trades meaningfully below the sector average of 44.9x, suggesting relative cheapness compared to peers despite internal capital inefficiencies. However, this discount may reflect market skepticism regarding the persistent negative ROIC-WACC spread rather than an undervaluation opportunity. A discounted cash flow analysis implies a fair value of $347 per share; without knowing the current trading price or implied growth rate assumptions used in that model, it remains unclear whether the market is pricing in a reversion to mean on capital efficiency or accepting permanent underperformance relative to the cost of debt and equity. The divergence between strong revenue growth and sub-par returns on invested capital creates ambiguity about whether future cash flows can sustain the current multiple without significant operational restructuring.
The risk-reward profile hinges entirely on management's ability to close the -4.0% spread, as continued operation below the WACC erodes intrinsic value despite high sales velocity. While the low Beneish score offers some confidence in earnings transparency, the moderate Piotroski F-Score and negative capital spread suggest that traditional quality factors are not currently aligned with growth narratives. Investors must weigh whether the valuation discount relative to sector peers compensates sufficiently for the risk of sustained capital inefficiency or if the implied fair value from DCF models assumes a turnaround that historical fundamentals have yet to validate.
Generated by LLM from quantitative data inputs. May contain inaccuracies. Not investment advice.
DCF Sandbox
InteractiveSensitivity Matrix
| TG ↓ / WACC → | 8.9% | 10.9% | 12.9% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2% | $430 | $308 | $231 |
| 3% | $503 | $347 | $255 |
| 4% | $604 | $397 | $284 |
Center = base case. Green = >10% upside, Red = >10% downside vs —.
Pre-computed DCF: WACC=10.9%, terminal growth 3%. Fair value $347 (+0.0%). Not investment advice.
Valuation Context
Price Chart with Moving Averages
Quant Health Deep Dive
Profitability & Value Creation
Balance Sheet Health
Earnings Surprise History
EPS estimates vs actuals for the most recent reported quarters. Source: yfinance.
Underwater (Drawdown from Peak)
How far below the all-time high the price has been over time. Deeper = more pain for holders.
Rolling 60-Day Beta vs S&P 500 (VOO)
How the stock's sensitivity to market moves changes over time. β > 1 = more volatile than the market.
Fundamentals
Passive Flow Attribution
ETF Draft EffectWhen investors buy or sell ETFs like MDYG or SPMD, the fund manager is mechanically forced to buy or sell DY shares regardless of Dycom Industries, Inc.'s individual fundamentals. We estimate $756M of passive capital is structurally linked to DY through 8 tracked ETFs. Passive flows have a limited but growing influence on DY's daily trading dynamics.
Passive exposure = Σ (ETF AUM × stock weight in ETF) across 8 tracked ETFs. Actual passive ownership is larger (includes mutual funds). Not investment advice.
ETF Contagion Visualizer
Simulate a price drop in Dycom Industries, Inc. to visualize passive redemption contagion across ETFs and collateral stocks.
If Dycom Industries, Inc. (DY) experiences a significant drawdown, ETF redemptions can create collateral selling pressure on co-held stocks. Our model identifies FLEX LTD (FLEX) as the most exposed collateral stock, sharing 2 ETFs with DY. This is the "Passive Contagion" effect described in the Inelastic Market Hypothesis.
Contagion model based on shared ETF exposure and constituent weights across 11 tracked ETFs. Estimated selling pressure is a simplified model — actual impact depends on market liquidity, ETF redemption mechanics, and market-maker activity.
DY Ownership Dynamics
ETFs with Highest DY Exposure
Float lock-up computed from 11 ETFs tracked by SecuritiesDB. Actual passive ownership is higher (includes mutual funds, pension funds, etc.).
DY Capital Efficiency
How efficiently does Dycom Industries, Inc. convert operating profits into free cash? The FCF Conversion ratio measures the gap between accounting earnings and real cash generation.
Dycom Industries, Inc. converts 57% of its EBITDA into free cash flow, a healthy conversion rate indicating efficient capital management — the business generates substantial cash after reinvestment. However, the ROIC-WACC spread is negative (-4.0%), suggesting reinvested capital is destroying shareholder value.
Capital efficiency = Free Cash Flow ÷ EBITDA. Reinvestment = (EBITDA − FCF) ÷ EBITDA. Metrics from latest annual filings. Not investment advice.
Fails-to-Deliver (FTD) History
SEC-reported settlement failures. Elevated FTDs can indicate high short-selling pressure, operational settlement issues, or naked shorting activity.
| Date | Failed Shares | Close Price | Notional Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-14 | 2,422 | $444.81 | $1.1M |
| 2026-05-07 | 1,057 | $457.78 | $483,873.46 |
| 2026-04-27 | 69 | $410.72 | $28,339.68 |
| 2026-04-23 | 12,702 | $408.05 | $5.2M |
| 2026-04-20 | 8,964 | $399.45 | $3.6M |
| 2026-03-31 | 4,891 | $324.73 | $1.6M |
| 2026-03-25 | 6 | $350.63 | $2,103.78 |
| 2026-03-24 | 82 | $349.74 | $28,678.68 |
| 2026-03-23 | 251 | $336.38 | $84,431.38 |
| 2026-03-18 | 1,285 | $361.43 | $464,437.55 |
| 2026-03-17 | 2,605 | $357.96 | $932,485.8 |
| 2026-03-04 | 61 | $403.49 | $24,612.89 |
| 2026-02-27 | 2,623 | $420.51 | $1.1M |
| 2026-02-25 | 319 | $428.58 | $136,717.02 |
| 2026-02-23 | 83 | $429.73 | $35,667.59 |
| 2026-02-20 | 43 | $419.40 | $18,034.2 |
| 2026-02-17 | 620 | $427.48 | $265,037.6 |
| 2026-02-10 | 55 | $415.28 | $22,840.4 |
| 2026-02-04 | 156 | $391.70 | $61,105.2 |
| 2026-01-23 | 108 | $379.10 | $40,942.8 |
| 2025-12-10 | 28 | $347.21 | $9,721.88 |
| 2025-11-21 | 188 | $323.37 | $60,793.56 |
| 2025-11-19 | 98 | $296.20 | $29,027.6 |
| 2025-11-13 | 149 | $295.57 | $44,039.93 |
| 2025-11-04 | 57 | $286.19 | $16,312.83 |
Source: SEC Regulation SHO FTD data. Data is reported with a ~30 day delay. High FTD quantities relative to average daily volume may indicate settlement stress.
Compare DY to Peers
Quant metrics computed deterministically from financial statements and price data. Updated: N/A.
SecuritiesDB provides programmatic data aggregation for informational purposes only. None of the metrics, summaries, or algorithmic flags constitute a recommendation to buy or sell any security.