GOGO (GOGO)
Quantitative Summary
DeterministicFinancial health is average: Piotroski 6/9, Altman Z 0.1. Beneish M-Score of -2.18 exceeds the -2.22 academic threshold — earnings quality may warrant further review.
Generated deterministically from quant metrics and financial statements. Not a recommendation.
Algorithmic Teardown
AI-GeneratedThe fundamental economics present a dichotomy between robust top-line momentum and precarious balance sheet stability. While revenue expansion of 104.7% suggests aggressive scaling, the ROIC-WACC spread remains narrow at +0.6%, indicating that capital allocation efficiency is currently marginal relative to the cost of financing. The DuPont decomposition reveals an unusual structural dynamic where a gross margin of 44.3% coexists with a net margin compressed to just 1.4%; this discrepancy implies either significant operating leverage costs or substantial non-operating dilution, as high turnover alone cannot explain such thin profitability on sales. Credit risk metrics further complicate the picture: an Altman Z-Score of 0.1 signals severe distress territory and potential insolvency risks, despite a favorable Beneish M-Score of -2.18 that statistically suggests low earnings manipulation probability. The Piotroski F-Score of 6/9 confirms moderate financial strength but fails to offset the alarming implications of the Z-Score regarding long-term viability.
Valuation metrics appear disconnected from current operational realities, creating a significant premium over intrinsic value estimates. Trading at a P/E ratio of 46.2x, which likely exceeds both historical norms and sector averages given the low net margin, the market is pricing in sustained hyper-growth that may not be sustainable if operating efficiencies do not improve. A DCF analysis places fair value significantly lower than current trading levels, implying that existing shareholders are paying a heavy premium for future growth expectations while ignoring near-term solvency constraints embedded in the Altman metric. This valuation gap suggests the market is heavily weighting revenue velocity over profitability quality and balance sheet resilience.
The risk-reward profile exhibits extreme asymmetry driven by conflicting signals on earnings integrity versus liquidity survival. While the negative Beneish M-Score alleviates concerns regarding accounting fraud, the critically low Altman Z-Score introduces a binary downside event where default could occur regardless of reported earnings manipulation levels. The combination of hyper-growth revenue and near-insolvency metrics creates a scenario where standard value investing frameworks break down; any deterioration in cash flow conversion would likely trigger immediate distress given the current leverage profile implied by the ROIC-WACC compression.
Generated by LLM from quantitative data inputs. May contain inaccuracies. Not investment advice.
DCF Sandbox
InteractiveSensitivity Matrix
| TG ↓ / WACC → | 6% | 7.1% | 9.1% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2% | $19 | $14 | $8 |
| 3% | $27 | $18 | $10 |
| 4% | $41 | $24 | $12 |
Center = base case. Green = >10% upside, Red = >10% downside vs —.
Pre-computed DCF: WACC=7.1%, terminal growth 3%. Fair value $18 (+0.0%). Not investment advice.
Price Chart with Moving Averages
Quant Health Deep Dive
Profitability & Value Creation
Balance Sheet Health
Earnings Surprise History
EPS estimates vs actuals for the most recent reported quarters. Source: yfinance.
Underwater (Drawdown from Peak)
How far below the all-time high the price has been over time. Deeper = more pain for holders.
Rolling 60-Day Beta vs S&P 500 (VOO)
How the stock's sensitivity to market moves changes over time. β > 1 = more volatile than the market.
Fundamentals
ETF Contagion Visualizer
Simulate a price drop in GOGO to visualize passive redemption contagion across ETFs and collateral stocks.
If GOGO (GOGO) experiences a significant drawdown, ETF redemptions can create collateral selling pressure on co-held stocks. Our model identifies Facebook Inc. Class A (META) as the most exposed collateral stock, sharing 1 ETFs with GOGO. This is the "Passive Contagion" effect described in the Inelastic Market Hypothesis.
Contagion model based on shared ETF exposure and constituent weights across 5 tracked ETFs. Estimated selling pressure is a simplified model — actual impact depends on market liquidity, ETF redemption mechanics, and market-maker activity.
GOGO Ownership Dynamics
ETFs with Highest GOGO Exposure
Float lock-up computed from 5 ETFs tracked by SecuritiesDB. Actual passive ownership is higher (includes mutual funds, pension funds, etc.).
GOGO Capital Efficiency
How efficiently does GOGO convert operating profits into free cash? The FCF Conversion ratio measures the gap between accounting earnings and real cash generation.
GOGO converts 31% of its EBITDA into free cash flow, a moderate conversion rate — significant EBITDA is consumed by capital expenditures, working capital changes, or interest payments. The 69% reinvestment rate signals aggressive capacity expansion. The positive ROIC-WACC spread of 0.6% confirms that reinvested capital creates shareholder value.
Capital efficiency = Free Cash Flow ÷ EBITDA. Reinvestment = (EBITDA − FCF) ÷ EBITDA. Metrics from latest annual filings. Not investment advice.
Fails-to-Deliver (FTD) History
SEC-reported settlement failures. Elevated FTDs can indicate high short-selling pressure, operational settlement issues, or naked shorting activity.
| Date | Failed Shares | Close Price | Notional Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-13 | 42,343 | $4.19 | $177,417.17 |
| 2026-05-11 | 358 | $4.40 | $1,575.2 |
| 2026-04-30 | 18,766 | $3.97 | $74,501.02 |
| 2026-04-29 | 63 | $4.04 | $254.52 |
| 2026-04-27 | 254 | $4.04 | $1,026.16 |
| 2026-04-10 | 1,381 | $4.60 | $6,352.6 |
| 2026-04-07 | 504 | $4.16 | $2,096.64 |
| 2026-03-23 | 387,031 | $4.26 | $1.6M |
| 2026-03-18 | 8,081 | $4.38 | $35,394.78 |
| 2026-03-16 | 4,651 | $4.31 | $20,045.81 |
| 2026-03-09 | 20 | $5.23 | $104.6 |
| 2026-02-25 | 2,568 | $4.50 | $11,556 |
| 2026-02-11 | 49 | $4.11 | $201.39 |
| 2026-02-09 | 1,734 | $4.18 | $7,248.12 |
| 2026-02-04 | 132 | $4.24 | $559.68 |
| 2026-02-02 | 540 | $4.59 | $2,478.6 |
| 2026-01-27 | 124,877 | $4.56 | $569,439.12 |
| 2026-01-22 | 600 | $4.80 | $2,880 |
| 2026-01-08 | 1,976 | $4.70 | $9,287.2 |
| 2026-01-05 | 11,083 | $4.76 | $52,755.08 |
| 2025-12-29 | 22 | $4.61 | $101.42 |
| 2025-12-26 | 22 | $4.61 | $101.42 |
| 2025-12-17 | 15,340 | $4.70 | $72,098 |
| 2025-12-11 | 23,780 | $5.61 | $133,405.8 |
| 2025-12-05 | 802 | $7.03 | $5,638.06 |
| 2025-11-24 | 200 | $7.06 | $1,412 |
| 2025-11-21 | 1,908 | $6.74 | $12,859.92 |
| 2025-11-19 | 3,520 | $6.79 | $23,900.8 |
| 2025-11-18 | 4,032 | $6.87 | $27,699.84 |
| 2025-11-05 | 4,563 | $8.75 | $39,926.25 |
Source: SEC Regulation SHO FTD data. Data is reported with a ~30 day delay. High FTD quantities relative to average daily volume may indicate settlement stress.
Compare GOGO to Peers
Quant metrics computed deterministically from financial statements and price data. Updated: N/A.
SecuritiesDB provides programmatic data aggregation for informational purposes only. None of the metrics, summaries, or algorithmic flags constitute a recommendation to buy or sell any security.