HPE (HPE)
Quantitative Summary
DeterministicFinancial health is average: Piotroski 4/9.
Generated deterministically from quant metrics and financial statements. Not a recommendation.
Algorithmic Teardown
AI-GeneratedThe fundamental economics of the company reveal a stark divergence between top-line momentum and bottom-line efficiency. While revenue growth accelerates at 13.8% year-over-year, indicating strong demand or market share gains, this expansion is not translating into profitability; net margins remain compressed at just 0.2%. This erosion in earnings power suggests that the rapid sales increase may be driven by lower-margin initiatives or heavy investment cycles rather than pricing power. Consequently, capital efficiency metrics are severely strained, with Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) sitting at a negligible 2.5% and DuPont-decomposed ROE collapsing to 0.2%, primarily due to the minimal net margin component despite moderate asset turnover of 0.45x and leverage of 3.07x. The Piotroski F-Score of 4/9 reflects mediocre financial strength relative to historical standards, though a Beneish M-Score of -2.30 signals low probability of earnings manipulation, suggesting the poor profitability metrics are likely operational realities rather than accounting distortions.
Valuation implications stem directly from this lack of sustainable earnings generation. With net income essentially flat in dollar terms despite growing revenue, traditional P/E multiples become distorted and difficult to contextualize against historical averages or sector peers without knowing specific current price levels. A Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) analysis would likely yield a wide valuation range given the high sensitivity of cash flow projections when margins are so thin; any slight improvement in net margin assumptions could dramatically alter fair value estimates, while implied growth rates appear disconnected from actual profit conversion capabilities. The market appears to be pricing in significant operational leverage potential or turnaround execution risk rather than immediate earnings accretion, creating a scenario where the stock's current price may reflect speculative optimism about future margin expansion that has not yet materialized in the financial statements.
Risk assessment highlights substantial insider activity as a critical delta; over the last 90 days, net insider selling totaled approximately $10.3 million, which typically suggests management views shares as relatively expensive or anticipates near-term challenges not fully captured by current fundamentals. Although the low Beneish score mitigates concerns regarding fraudulent reporting, the combination of negative free cash flow potential (implied by zero net income), weak ROIC, and significant insider outflows creates a skewed risk-reward profile where downside protection is limited until profitability metrics improve substantially. Investors must weigh whether the 13.8% revenue growth can eventually drive margin recovery or if these structural inefficiencies will persist, potentially capping long-term total returns regardless of multiple expansion.
Generated by LLM from quantitative data inputs. May contain inaccuracies. Not investment advice.
Price Chart with Moving Averages
Quant Health Deep Dive
Profitability & Value Creation
⚠️ Dividend consumes >80% of FCF — sustainability risk.
DuPont Analysis — ROE Decomposition
Breaking down Return on Equity to see how the company generates its ROE — efficiency, margins, or leverage.
Balance Sheet Health
Insider Activity (Last 90 Days)
Open-market buys vs sells by company insiders. Source: yfinance.
Earnings Surprise History
EPS estimates vs actuals for the most recent reported quarters. Source: yfinance.
Underwater (Drawdown from Peak)
How far below the all-time high the price has been over time. Deeper = more pain for holders.
Rolling 60-Day Beta vs S&P 500 (VOO)
How the stock's sensitivity to market moves changes over time. β > 1 = more volatile than the market.
Fundamentals
Passive Flow Attribution
ETF Draft EffectWhen investors buy or sell ETFs like ONEY or VOE, the fund manager is mechanically forced to buy or sell HPE shares regardless of HPE's individual fundamentals. We estimate $5.6B of passive capital is structurally linked to HPE through 8 tracked ETFs. This substantial passive exposure means that ETF inflows and outflows — not company fundamentals — can dominate daily volume on this stock.
Passive exposure = Σ (ETF AUM × stock weight in ETF) across 8 tracked ETFs. Actual passive ownership is larger (includes mutual funds). Not investment advice.
ETF Contagion Visualizer
Simulate a price drop in HPE to visualize passive redemption contagion across ETFs and collateral stocks.
If HPE (HPE) experiences a significant drawdown, ETF redemptions can create collateral selling pressure on co-held stocks. Our model identifies ALTRIA GROUP INC (MO) as the most exposed collateral stock, sharing 3 ETFs with HPE. This is the "Passive Contagion" effect described in the Inelastic Market Hypothesis.
Contagion model based on shared ETF exposure and constituent weights across 31 tracked ETFs. Estimated selling pressure is a simplified model — actual impact depends on market liquidity, ETF redemption mechanics, and market-maker activity.
HPE Ownership Dynamics
ETFs with Highest HPE Exposure
Float lock-up computed from 31 ETFs tracked by SecuritiesDB. Actual passive ownership is higher (includes mutual funds, pension funds, etc.).
HPE Capital Efficiency
How efficiently does HPE convert operating profits into free cash? The FCF Conversion ratio measures the gap between accounting earnings and real cash generation.
HPE converts 14% of its EBITDA into free cash flow, a low conversion rate suggesting heavy reinvestment. This may indicate a growth phase (building capacity) or structural capital intensity. The 86% reinvestment rate signals aggressive capacity expansion.
Capital efficiency = Free Cash Flow ÷ EBITDA. Reinvestment = (EBITDA − FCF) ÷ EBITDA. Metrics from latest annual filings. Not investment advice.
Fails-to-Deliver (FTD) History
SEC-reported settlement failures. Elevated FTDs can indicate high short-selling pressure, operational settlement issues, or naked shorting activity.
| Date | Failed Shares | Close Price | Notional Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-14 | 220,001 | $32.07 | $7.1M |
| 2026-05-11 | 2,158 | $31.35 | $67,653.3 |
| 2026-05-07 | 2 | $30.37 | $60.74 |
| 2026-05-05 | 178 | $28.71 | $5,110.38 |
| 2026-05-04 | 2 | $28.57 | $57.14 |
| 2026-04-30 | 101,431 | $28.30 | $2.9M |
| 2026-04-29 | 5,241 | $27.95 | $146,485.95 |
| 2026-04-27 | 299 | $28.16 | $8,419.84 |
| 2026-04-24 | 107 | $27.93 | $2,988.51 |
| 2026-04-22 | 94,427 | $28.76 | $2.7M |
| 2026-04-20 | 18,532 | $26.44 | $489,986.08 |
| 2026-04-17 | 498 | $25.89 | $12,893.22 |
| 2026-04-15 | 437 | $24.47 | $10,693.39 |
| 2026-04-14 | 3,430 | $24.81 | $85,098.3 |
| 2026-04-13 | 68 | $24.89 | $1,692.52 |
| 2026-04-09 | 401,290 | $24.98 | $10.0M |
| 2026-04-07 | 1,520 | $24.58 | $37,361.6 |
| 2026-04-06 | 1,802 | $24.61 | $44,347.22 |
| 2026-03-30 | 6,425 | $23.94 | $153,814.5 |
| 2026-03-25 | 7,799 | $23.90 | $186,396.1 |
| 2026-03-24 | 300 | $22.32 | $6,696 |
| 2026-03-23 | 1 | $21.69 | $21.69 |
| 2026-03-20 | 2,057 | $22.12 | $45,500.84 |
| 2026-03-16 | 1,000 | $21.58 | $21,580 |
| 2026-03-10 | 2 | $21.81 | $43.62 |
| 2026-03-05 | 2,307 | $21.55 | $49,715.85 |
| 2026-03-03 | 336 | $22.13 | $7,435.68 |
| 2026-02-17 | 111 | $22.69 | $2,518.59 |
| 2026-02-13 | 115,396 | $22.20 | $2.6M |
| 2026-02-12 | 4,250 | $23.81 | $101,192.5 |
Source: SEC Regulation SHO FTD data. Data is reported with a ~30 day delay. High FTD quantities relative to average daily volume may indicate settlement stress.
Compare HPE to Peers
Quant metrics computed deterministically from financial statements and price data. Updated: N/A.
SecuritiesDB provides programmatic data aggregation for informational purposes only. None of the metrics, summaries, or algorithmic flags constitute a recommendation to buy or sell any security.