PRME (PRME)
Quantitative Summary
DeterministicBelow-average fundamentals indicated by Piotroski score of 3/9; Altman Z of -3.4 falls in the academic distress zone.
Generated deterministically from quant metrics and financial statements. Not a recommendation.
Algorithmic Teardown
AI-GeneratedThe fundamental economics of PRME exhibit severe distress, characterized by a capital allocation mechanism that actively destroys value. With an ROIC-WACC spread of -72.4%, the firm generates returns far below its cost of capital, indicating inefficient deployment of equity and debt. This weakness is compounded by a Piotroski F-Score of 3/9 and an Altman Z-Score of -3.4, both signaling high probability of financial deterioration or bankruptcy under standard scoring models. The DuPont decomposition reveals that the negative ROE is driven almost entirely by catastrophic margin compression rather than leverage issues; a net margin of -4342.4% suggests structural operational failures despite revenue growth of 55.3%. Such extreme profitability erosion renders traditional valuation metrics meaningless, as earnings are volatile and likely non-recurring or one-off in nature.
Valuation analysis is further complicated by the disconnect between top-line expansion and bottom-line reality. While revenue grew significantly year-over-year, the market's pricing must account for the inability to convert this volume into profit, a scenario often priced at extreme discounts due to bankruptcy risk rather than growth potential. Any implied growth rate derived from current earnings would be mathematically impossible given the negative spread between returns and capital costs. The absence of historical P/E context is mitigated by the fact that traditional multiples fail in environments where net income is deeply negative, forcing an assessment based on asset liquidation values or normalized cash flows rather than multiple expansion.
Risk factor data underscores a significant downside skew with limited upside catalysts embedded in current metrics. The stock displays a Fama-French Alpha of -3.71% annually and a Value Factor (HML) of -0.626, confirming the market has aggressively priced it as a growth asset despite its weak profitability profile. This misalignment between valuation tilt and actual performance is exacerbated by a Profitability Factor (RMW) score of -2.865, highlighting that the security underperforms peers on fundamental quality metrics across multiple dimensions. The combination of negative alpha, poor value characteristics relative to growth expectations, and deteriorating profitability suggests the risk/reward profile is heavily weighted toward capital preservation concerns rather than return generation potential.
Generated by LLM from quantitative data inputs. May contain inaccuracies. Not investment advice.
Price Chart with Moving Averages
Quant Health Deep Dive
Profitability & Value Creation
Balance Sheet Health
Earnings Surprise History
EPS estimates vs actuals for the most recent reported quarters. Source: yfinance.
Risk Profile
Sharpe = risk-adjusted return (higher is better). Max drawdown = largest peak-to-trough decline. 1,200+ trading days.
Underwater (Drawdown from Peak)
How far below the all-time high the price has been over time. Deeper = more pain for holders.
Rolling 60-Day Beta vs S&P 500 (VOO)
How the stock's sensitivity to market moves changes over time. β > 1 = more volatile than the market.
Fama-French 5-Factor Exposure
Academic factor model decomposition — what's really driving this stock's returns.
Fama-French 5-Factor Model. Data: Kenneth French Data Library. Regression over 3 years of daily returns.
Fundamentals
Passive Flow Attribution
ETF Draft EffectWhen investors buy or sell ETFs like ARKG or XBI, the fund manager is mechanically forced to buy or sell PRME shares regardless of PRME's individual fundamentals. We estimate $26M of passive capital is structurally linked to PRME through 3 tracked ETFs. Passive flows have a limited but growing influence on PRME's daily trading dynamics.
Passive exposure = Σ (ETF AUM × stock weight in ETF) across 3 tracked ETFs. Actual passive ownership is larger (includes mutual funds). Not investment advice.
ETF Contagion Visualizer
Simulate a price drop in PRME to visualize passive redemption contagion across ETFs and collateral stocks.
If PRME (PRME) experiences a significant drawdown, ETF redemptions can create collateral selling pressure on co-held stocks. Our model identifies Eli Lilly & Co. (LLY) as the most exposed collateral stock, sharing 1 ETFs with PRME. This is the "Passive Contagion" effect described in the Inelastic Market Hypothesis.
Contagion model based on shared ETF exposure and constituent weights across 3 tracked ETFs. Estimated selling pressure is a simplified model — actual impact depends on market liquidity, ETF redemption mechanics, and market-maker activity.
PRME Ownership Dynamics
Passive funds hold 1 in every 18 PRME shares, reducing daily market volatility.
PRME (PRME) exerts measurable gravity on the passive index market, currently representing 1.1% of the ARK Genomic Revolution ETF (ARKG) and 0.2% of the XBI (XBI). Across 4 tracked ETFs, approximately 10M shares (5.5% of float) are held by passive funds and rarely trade on the open market. As passive ownership grows, index inclusion changes may increasingly drive price discovery.
ETFs with Highest PRME Exposure
Float lock-up computed from 4 ETFs tracked by SecuritiesDB. Actual passive ownership is higher (includes mutual funds, pension funds, etc.).
PRME Institutional Volume Profile
252-day volume distribution by price level. The Point of Control (POC) marks — the price where the most institutional volume transacted — an implicit support/resistance floor.
The highest-volume price zone for PRME over the past year sits near $3.63 (20% of 252-day volume). The current price of $3.21 sits 11.4% below the POC — suggesting potential mean-reversion upside if institutional demand reasserts at this level. The highly concentrated volume profile (20% at POC) indicates strong consensus on fair value — institutional participants have repeatedly transacted near this price.
Volume Profile computed from 252 trading days of OHLCV data. Volume allocated to price bins proportionally based on daily high-low range. Not investment advice.
Fails-to-Deliver (FTD) History
SEC-reported settlement failures. Elevated FTDs can indicate high short-selling pressure, operational settlement issues, or naked shorting activity.
| Date | Failed Shares | Close Price | Notional Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-13 | 5,207 | $3.30 | $17,183.1 |
| 2026-05-01 | 10,366 | $3.55 | $36,799.3 |
| 2026-04-27 | 1,184 | $3.70 | $4,380.8 |
| 2026-04-23 | 1,136 | $3.96 | $4,498.56 |
| 2026-04-20 | 157 | $3.81 | $598.17 |
| 2026-04-16 | 9,644 | $3.79 | $36,550.76 |
| 2026-04-13 | 883 | $3.43 | $3,028.69 |
| 2026-04-09 | 1,283 | $3.54 | $4,541.82 |
| 2026-04-08 | 51,399 | $3.41 | $175,270.59 |
| 2026-03-31 | 64,381 | $3.15 | $202,800.15 |
| 2026-03-26 | 77,078 | $3.63 | $279,793.14 |
| 2026-03-25 | 25 | $3.52 | $88 |
| 2026-03-19 | 81,104 | $3.53 | $286,297.12 |
| 2026-03-18 | 76,577 | $3.71 | $284,100.67 |
| 2026-03-17 | 91,852 | $3.67 | $337,096.84 |
| 2026-03-16 | 1,669 | $3.65 | $6,091.85 |
| 2026-03-12 | 364,143 | $3.83 | $1.4M |
| 2026-03-11 | 1,289 | $4.05 | $5,220.45 |
| 2026-03-06 | 542,637 | $3.93 | $2.1M |
| 2026-03-04 | 55,474 | $4.23 | $234,655.02 |
| 2026-03-03 | 30,186 | $4.66 | $140,666.76 |
| 2026-03-02 | 144,565 | $4.62 | $667,890.3 |
| 2026-02-26 | 230,885 | $4.13 | $953,555.05 |
| 2026-02-25 | 90,259 | $3.83 | $345,691.97 |
| 2026-02-13 | 73,312 | $3.32 | $243,395.84 |
| 2026-02-12 | 234 | $3.45 | $807.3 |
| 2026-02-06 | 405,984 | $3.24 | $1.3M |
| 2026-02-05 | 323,269 | $3.48 | $1.1M |
| 2026-02-04 | 1,135 | $3.81 | $4,324.35 |
| 2026-02-03 | 3,912 | $3.80 | $14,865.6 |
Source: SEC Regulation SHO FTD data. Data is reported with a ~30 day delay. High FTD quantities relative to average daily volume may indicate settlement stress.
Price Correlations
Statistical correlation of daily returns with other stocks. High correlations indicate stocks that move together; negative correlations can offer diversification.
| Peer | 252-Day (1Y) | 126-Day (6M) | Direction |
|---|---|---|---|
| WTGXX | NaN | NaN | |
| CRSP | 0.586 | 0.657 | Moderate |
| BEAM | 0.582 | 0.651 | Moderate |
| RXRX | 0.536 | 0.620 | Moderate |
| NTLA | 0.480 | 0.572 | Moderate |
| ABSI | 0.433 | 0.517 | Moderate |
| SDGR | 0.412 | 0.498 | Moderate |
| PACB | 0.370 | 0.508 | Moderate |
| CRCL | 0.351 | 0.292 | Moderate |
| ARCT | 0.330 | 0.393 | Moderate |
Pearson correlation of daily log returns. 252d ≈ 1 trading year. Computed from price history. Not investment advice.
Compare PRME to Peers
Quant metrics computed deterministically from financial statements and price data. Updated: 2026-06-02.
SecuritiesDB provides programmatic data aggregation for informational purposes only. None of the metrics, summaries, or algorithmic flags constitute a recommendation to buy or sell any security.